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Abstract The paper contributes to the discussion of fiscal competition with
infrastructure goods. We explicitly focus on the costs of providing public infra-
structure capital that appear in the public budget as investment. Thus we analyse the
problem in a dynamic framework. Public infrastructure is considered as a marginal
product complement to private capital. A central result of the model is that the fact
that public capital is a complement to private capital, so that an increase in the
supply of public capital ceteris paribus improves the marginal productivity of
private capital, cannot be used as an argument to support a source tax. The so-called
indirect productivity effect on private capital induced by public inputs does not
justify the taxation of mobile capital. Rather, the efficiency of a source tax on
mobile capital income depends on the question of whether or not the public input
generates a factor rent to private capital.
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1 Introduction
A standard argument in the theory of fiscal competition is that small open
economies should not levy a source tax on international mobile capital, because
capital will always be able to shift the tax burden to immobile factors (Wildasin
2000; Sinn 1997). However, it is still debatable whether a capital income tax is a
proper instrument to finance productive public infrastructure. An essential
contribution to the discussion of fiscal competition with infrastructure goods was
made by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), who oppose that a source-based capital
tax is an efficient instrument to finance public inputs.1 A contrasting view is taken
by Oates and Schwab (1991, 1988). They posit that a source tax on mobile capital
can be interpreted as a benefit tax and thus justified as a price for public inputs. Any
attempts to attract new business investment by lowering taxes below the cost of
providing productive public goods will neither increase income nor create jobs in
the community. Gerber and Hewitt (1987) attempt a synthesis of the two
perspectives by categorizing the infrastructure goods according to their rivalry
features. They distinguish between publicly provided private inputs and the
‘‘creation of atmosphere’’ type of public capital, as first described by Meade (1952),
and conclude that a source tax is a proper instrument to finance publicly provided
private inputs. Richter (1994) and Matsumoto (2000) discuss a fiscal competition
model with so-called firm-augmenting public capital, where the costs of providing
public inputs are assumed to rise with the number of firms in the jurisdiction. In this
framework, a capital tax can be justified to avoid overly high profit taxes. A survey
of different types of public inputs is given by Feehan (1989). Sinn (2003, 1997)
considers infrastructure goods that lower the costs of using private capital. In his
model, the government sets a source tax equal to the marginal congestion externality
of private capital (Sinn 2003, p. 34).
Although most theoretical work in the area of infrastructure competition deals
with the welfare implications of alternative ways of financing public capital, none of
these studies examine government as an investing agent. In this paper we focus on
the costs of providing and improving the public capital stock that appears in the
public budget as investment. Thus the problem must be analyzed in a dynamic
framework.2 The policy question discussed in this paper is whether public
infrastructure investment expenditures should be financed by mobile capital
according to the benefit-taxation principle. We take the perspective of a small
open economy that competes for mobile capital. Public infrastructure is considered
as a marginal product complement to private capital. This means that public
1 Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) argue that a source-based capital tax leads to an underprovision of
public inputs even if the resulting tax income is used by the government to finance local public inputs.
Thus, a jurisdictional government would prefer to tax its residents by a non-distorting lump sum tax.
Noiset (1995) shows that in the framework of Zodrow and Mieszkowski, a tax on capital can under
certain conditions also lead to an overprovison of public inputs. Matsumoto (1998) shows that Noiset’s
result of potential overprovision depends on the exogenity of the number of firms in the Zodrow-
Miezskowski model.
2 Several previous studies have examined interesting aspects of intertemporal fiscal competition, e.g.
Wildasin (2003b), Huizinga and Nielsen (1997).
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infrastructure influences the private factor productivity positively and can thus be
used by the government in order to accommodate mobile capital (Pfa¨hler et al.
1997). A central result of the model outlined in this paper is that the efficiency of a
capital income tax depends not only on the rivalry features of public capital but also
on the question of whether or not public capital generates a factor rent to private
capital.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews alternative specifications of
public inputs which are based on the degree of homogeneity of the production
function. Section 3 presents a dynamic model of a small open economy where
private capital formation and saving decisions are influenced by a source-based tax,
a flat rate wage tax and the supply of productive infrastructure. The markets for
goods and inputs are perfectly competitive and both goods and private capital are
perfectly mobile across borders. Section 4 is devoted to the question of how
governments design an optimal investment and financing policy. According to the
neoclassical approach, the public decision-maker seeks to promote social welfare,
while acting as a price-taker in the capital market and not engaging in strategic
interaction in response to the policies of neighbouring jurisdictions.3 In Sect. 5 the
analysis explicitly indicates how the opportunity costs of public investments depend
on the financing instruments used. Section 6 highlights in detail the incidence of a
source tax in the steady state. It is then followed by some conclusions in Sect. 7
2 Public investment and production technology
Our first focus is the time-invariant production technologies used in the jurisdiction.
There are different factors of production: labour Lt, private capital Kt and three
kinds of public capital Gi,t (for i = P, K, L) which are used by private firms to
produce one homogeneous good Yt at time t. The price of Yt is normalized to unity.
The labour supply grows at an exogenous rate n, thus Lt+1 = (1 + n)Lt. Capital is
simply non-consumed output. The production function
AðGP;tÞFðKt; GK;t; Lt; GL;tÞ ¼ Yt ð1Þ
exhibits positive diminishing marginal products with respect to each input, for all
factors Lt,Kt,Gi,t > 0 and the Inada conditions hold. All factors are complements in
the sense that the second-order cross derivations of A(GP,t) F(Kt,GK,t,Lt,GL,t) are
positive. The underlying production function for the private goods has increasing
returns of scale in all inputs, but F(Kt,GK,t,Lt,GL,t) is linear homogeneous in private
capital, labour and all kinds of publicly provided private inputs. A further property
of the production technology is that it faces diminishing returns to the accumulation
of private and public capital together. Thus the production function specifies
decreasing returns for fixed L. The public capital yields only production benefits, so
3 The question whether governments interact atomistically or like oligopolists is broadly discussed in the
literature of fiscal competition (Wildasin 2003a). When the number of regions becomes small, strategic
interaction between local governments plays an important role. Nevertheless, the aspect of strategic
behaviour of the government is not considered in our model.
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that households are not immediate beneficiaries of public capital.4 In theoretical
discussions, public inputs are mainly distinguished as follows (Feehan 1989; Arrow
and Kurz 1970):
• The ‘‘creation of atmosphere type’’ of public capital (GP,t): This type of
public input was first discussed by Meade (1952) and Kaizuka (1965) and
applied to a fiscal competition framework by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986)
and Matsumoto (1998).5 It exhibits no congestion externalities. The public
capital stock GP,t determines the total factor productivity A(GP,t). The marginal
effect of this specific kind of public infrastructure capital on total factor
productivity is qA(GP,t)/qGP,t. Therefore total factor productivity is not
considered to be exogenous but can be produced by the supply of GP,t. In the
discussion of a new start for the so-called ‘‘Lisbon Strategy’’, the European
Commission (2005) describes the public investments that a modern, knowledge-
economy needs to adapt in the face of changing economic and social conditions.
One of these public inputs is an effective regulation that has a significant
positive impact on the framework conditions for economic growth and
productivity. A second category of such public inputs is increased and improved
public investment in R&D. According to the European Commission (2005),
public support for young and innovative companies in particular can improve
total factor productivity. The quoted public inputs excellently describe what is
meant by GP,t.
• The publicly provided private input (GK,t and GL,t): The empirical literature
on local public expenditure shows that many publicly provided inputs have
roughly the same amount of rivalry as private goods (Gramlich 1994; Reiter and
Weichenrieder 1997; Bu¨ttner et al. 2004). Government provides such private
inputs because exclusion is either not possible or prohibitively expensive and a
market solution thus unsatisfactory. Since the private production function
exhibits constant returns in Kt, Lt, GL,t, and GK,t, the output Yt can be
decomposed into the imputed shares of private capital, government capital and
labour. According to Euler’s theorem
Yt ¼ oYtoKt Kt þ
oYt
oGK;t
GK;t
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
aggregate capital income
þ oYt
oLt
Lt þ oYtoGL;t GL;t
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
aggregate wage income
holds, so that national income is not exhausted if private inputs were paid their
partial marginal product. We assume that private capital and labour have some way
to appropriate the benefits of certain public inputs and convert them into private
factor income. Thus, the income share of the publicly provided private capital is
4 Wilson and Gordon (2003) discuss a model where households shift into or out of the jurisdiction in
response to increases or decreases of local tax rate and public consumption services. They assume,
however, that residents directly control tax rates whereas the government only controls expenditure.
5 This kind of public input is often referred to ‘‘factor-augmenting’’ because the benefits of the public
input accrue not to firms as profits but to the factor owners (see McMillan 1979). Note, that the creation of
atmosphere type of public capital induces only indirect productivity effects to capital and labour.
132 Empirica (2008) 35:129–143
123
distributed to private capital and labour, and both private factors are paid more than
their partial marginal product (Gramlich 1994).6 We distinguish a publicly provided
private input that is bound on labour (GL,t) and another one that is bound on private
capital (GK,t). These publicly provided inputs can only be used by firms by
employing private factors. An example of investments that increase GL,t and
improve labour income is public expenditure in education. According to the OECD
(2005) resources for education in OECD countries depend heavily on the allocation
of public budgets. Public funding today provides for most spending by educational
institutions, with over 90% of primary and secondary expenditure coming from this
source. Better-educated adults earn more on average. However, investment in
education brings both individual and collective rewards. With respect to GK,t we
think of public investment in a modern transportation and energy infrastructure. The
European Commission (2005) argues that this kind of public investment in
particular has a positive impact on private sector investment and enterprise
decisions by improving the economic attractiveness of locations. The described
example shows that public ownership of capital does not generate rents that directly
enter the public budget, but generates factor rents. As long as public inputs are free
of charge they can be interpreted as ‘‘unpaid factors’’.
3 The private sector
In the private sector, private capital has two costs to the firm: the rental price rt and a
source-based tax on capital revenue, where hK,t denotes the capital tax rate. Firms
invest capital up to the point where the marginal revenue of private investment
equals the costs. Since firms are free to invest and produce domestically or abroad,
net of tax return of capital is the same everywhere rt = r*. The supply of capital is
completely price elastic. The marginal revenue of private capital
r
1  hK;t ¼
oYt
oKt
þ oYt
oGK;t
GK;t
Kt
ð2Þ
is the sum of the partial product of private capital qYt/qKt plus the output share of
public capital appropriated by private capital (qYt/qGK,t)(GK,t/Kt).
7 Thus the
aggregate domestic output
Yt ¼ rKt þ Wt þ oYtoKt Kt þ
oYt
oGK;t
GK;t
 
hK;t
6 In the literature we also find ‘‘firm-augmenting’’ public inputs that are congestible among firms and
‘‘semi-public input’’ congestible within industries. Since we argue in a one-sector model, semi-public
inputs are not considered. Firm-augmenting public inputs are unpaid factors that generate a rent, which
can be absorbed by firms as a profit. In a fiscal competition framework, firm-augmenting public inputs
that generate profits are discussed by Richter (1994) and Matsumoto (2000).
7 This assumption is also found by Oates and Schwab (1991, p. 130) and Gerber and Hewitt (1987, p.
456).
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can be decomposed in an income share that goes to the mobile factor r*Kt, the gross
wage income Wt that goes to the immobile private households and the source tax
revenue received by the government.
Since we assumed that all factors are marginal product complements, the second-
order cross derivations of Yt are positive. Therefore all three kinds of public capital
have a so-called indirect productivity effect on private capital in the sense that an
increase in the supply of Gi,t raises the partial productivity of private capital.
However, only GK,t that is distributed among firms in proportion to each firm’s
capital stock generates a rent to private capital. Equation 2 shows that ceteris
paribus, an inflow of a marginal unit of private capital lowers the rent appropriated
by each unit of private capital invested in the jurisdiction and thus creates a negative
externality to private capital. This reminds us of congestion externalities as
modelled by Sinn (2003, 1997). However in our model the source tax is not justified
by externalities. What should in fact be the bad side of lowering a rent that goes to
the mobile factor? As will be shown, the potential problem of a marginal capital
inflow is the induced marginal effect to capital income that may exceed its partial
output effect if the source tax is chosen on an inefficient level.
The household sector is designed according to the overlapping-generations model.
An individual born at time t supplies a fixed amount of labour and pays a proportional tax
ratehL,t on per capita wage income wt = Wt/Lt. Since labour is supplied inelastically, the
wage tax can be considered as equivalent to a lump sum tax. From the perspective of the
private agents, the fiscal parameters Gi,t, hK,t, and hL,t are exogenous. Each young person
consumes cyt of the net income and saves the remainder st ¼ ð1  hL;tÞwt  cyt . In the
second period of his life the individual consumes cotþ1 that equals all his wealth, both
interest and principal cotþ1 ¼ stð1 þ rÞ. Like firms, private households have access to
the world capital market so r* is the time-invariant return on private saving. Domestic
and foreign claims on capital are assumed to be perfect substitutes as stores of value. No
residence-based tax on capital income is levied. The decision problem for young people
is to maximize the lifetime log utility function uðcyt ;cotþ1Þ ¼ lncyt þ J lncotþ1, with
0 < 0 < 1, subject to the budget constraint cyt ¼ ð1  hL;tÞwt  cotþ1=ð1 þ rÞ. The
parameter 0 denotes the subjective discount factor. The assumption of a log utility
function leads to a constant ratio of individual optimal consumption in the first and
second period of lifetime, which simplifies the following analyses. The optimal
consumption of somebody born in t when in old age is ct+1
o = 0 (1 + r*)ct
y. The lifetime
budget constraint of the private household is thus given by
0 ¼ ð1  hL;tÞwt  1 þ Jð Þcyt ð3Þ
The indirect utility function, that expresses the maximum utility achievable by
the private household at a given interest rate r* and wage income is given by
vðwt; hL;t; r;JÞ ¼ ln 1
1 þ Jð Þ þ J ln
Jð1 þ rÞ
1 þ Jð Þ
 
þ 1 þ Jð Þ lnðWt  /L;t=LtÞ:
ð4Þ
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4 The welfare maximizing tax and investment strategy of an autonomous
jurisdiction
The government’s total tax revenue is the sum of the capital tax revenue /K,t =
(Yt  Wt)hK,t and the wage tax revenue /L,t = Wt hL,t. Both tax rates hL,t and hK,t
are allowed to be time-variant. Public investment is
P
i¼P;K;L Gi;tþ1  ð1  viÞGi;t
and vi denotes the appropriate depreciation rate. Public consumption is neglected in
the model. The budget constraint of the public sector is thus given by
X
i¼P;K;L
Gi;tþ1  ð1  viÞGi;t
 	 /L;t  /K;t ¼ 0: ð5Þ
We assume that the government has the objective to maximize the utility
v(wt, /L,t, r*, 0) of its residents and discounts the utility of future generations at
rate k > 0. The government maximizes a social welfare function of the form
W ¼PT¼1t¼1 ð1 þ kÞ1tvðwt;/L;t; r;JÞ over an infinite optimization horizon8 sub-
ject to the private constraint (2) and the public budget constraint (5). Furthermore,
additional constraints hold that Gi,1 are given. Accordingly, the Lagrangian
expression is
Z /K;t;/L;t; Gi;tþ1; Ktþ1

  ¼ W þPT
t¼1
lt /L;t þ /K;t 
P
i¼P;K;L
Gi;tþ1 þ ð1  viÞGi;t
" #
þPT
t¼1
qt Yt Gi;t; Kt

  Wt Gi;t; Kt
  /K;t  rKt 	
where the Lagrange multipliers lt and qt are functions of the time t. The control
variables of the government are the capital tax revenue /K,t = (Yt  Wt)hK,t, the
wage tax revenue /L,t = Wt hL,t and the three kinds of public capital Gi,t (for i = P,
K, L). From the first-order conditions of the optimization problem – presented in the
Appendix – we deduce the shadow price in utility terms of tax revenue lt that
depends on the underlying tax instrument:
lt ð1 þ kÞ1t 1 þ Jð Þ
1
Wt  /L;t

 
( )
/L;t  0; /L;t
oZ
o/L;t
¼ 0 ð7Þ
lt ð1 þ kÞ1t 1 þ Jð Þ
1
Wt  /L;t

 
oWt
oKt
n o
r  oðYtWtÞ
oKt
h i /K;t  0; /K;t oZo/K;t ¼ 0 ð8Þ
8 If the government has the same time horizon as the private household, then T = 1. In this case the
government does not engage in public investment at all. The reason is that public investment undertaken
in period t affects only wage income earned in later periods, whereas the tax burden of financing this
public investment occurs in period t.
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From (1) and (2) we know rt* = (Yt  Wt /K,t)/Kt. The public decision-maker
uses the tax instrument that causes fewer utility losses for the private sector. Thus a
source-based tax on capital revenue /K,t  0 is chosen only if the first term of
condition (8) is binding. In this case the shadow price of a capital tax is smaller than
or equal to the shadow price of a wage tax. To meet this requirement
/K;t ¼ hK;tðYt  WtÞ ðYt  WtÞ 
oYt
oKt
Kt
 
must hold. Using Eq. 2 it can be shown that the amount of taxes contributed by
private capital never exceeds the share of public capital income that is appropriated
by private capital (qYt/qGK,t) GK,t. Given an interior solution the optimal source tax
rate is
hK;t ¼
oYt
oGK;t
GK;t
ðYt  WtÞ : ð9Þ
Thus the optimal public policy is to tax away the rents appropriated by the private
capital so that the corresponding tax revenue equals exactly the share of public
capital income (qYt/qGK,t)GK,t. This result is suggestive of Sandmo (1972), who
defines an optimal tax to finance a firm-augmenting public input as a direct charge
on firms. In Sandmo (1972), the firm-augmenting public input can be interpreted as
an unpaid factor that generates an excess profit to private firms. Since GK,t repre-
sents an unpaid factor that generates a factor rent to private capital, /K,t* is a direct
charge on private capital for the supply of GK,t. However, as shown in Kellermann
(2006) the revenue of this benefit tax is not cost equivalent in the sense that the tax
revenue /K,t* = (Yt  Wt) hK,t* covers exactly the public expense caused by the
optimal provision of GK,t.
That rents earned by mobile factors provides an efficient and thus highly
desirable means of raising tax revenue is certainly not a surprisingly result.
Zodrow (2006) quotes several arguments supporting source-based capital income
taxes on account of rents. What in a way may surprise, is that according to Eq. 9
neither the supply of public capital from the creation of atmosphere type GP,t nor
the supply of GL,t justifies a source tax on capital. The fact that GP,t and GL,t are
complements to private capital, so that an increase in the supply of both kinds of
public capital ceteris paribus improves the marginal productivity of private
capital, cannot be used as an argument to support a source tax. If the output
elasticity of GK,t is assumed to be zero, so that public capital generates no rents to
private capital, then hK,t* = 0 despite the beneficial impact of GP,t and GL,t that
goes to private capital.
In this respect, the optimal tax rule given by Eq. 9 deviates from the result
derived by Feehan and Matsumoto (2000). By examining the case of a creation of
atmosphere type of public capital,9 they argue that each of the private factors should
be taxed proportional to the change in this factor’s marginal productivity due to a
9 Feehan and Matsumoto (2000) use the expression factor-augmenting public input.
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marginal change in the public input. However, Feehan and Matsumoto (2000) do
not consider the case of a small open economy that competes for mobile capital but
argue in a static world where domestic factors are fixed in supply. Thus the problem
of capital flight is neglected. Compared with this, in our model capital flight is a
major concern of the welfare maximizing government. If the output elasticity of
GK,t is assumed to be zero, a source tax rate hK,t > 0 leads to inefficient low private
investment. Condition (2) shows that in this case the partial marginal output of
private capital exceeds the world interest rate qYt/qKt > r*. The income share of the
immobile factors, i.e. labour income and tax revenue, can thus be improved by
further capital inflows. The world interest rate r* can be interpreted as the
opportunity costs of private capital to the small open economy. In other words, a
reduction of the source tax raises wage income by more than the induced loss of tax
revenue, so that private households prefer a wage tax to a source tax. The only
exception occurs if the partial marginal productivity of qYt/qKt < r*. In this case the
output elasticity of GK,t is positive and the mobile private capital appropriates a
factor rent, that according to (9) justifies a source tax.
Note that for hK,t = hK,t* the private marginal rate of time preference [(qu/qc1
y)/
(qu/qc1+1
0 )1] as well as the partial productivity of private capital equalizes the
marked interest rate r*. On that score in the private sector, the source tax rate hK,t*
makes a first best solution possible. According to the so-called ‘‘second-best shadow
pricing approaches’’, discussed in the theory of optimal taxation, we would expect
that in this case the government should also use r* as a social discount rate (Sandmo
and Dre`ze 1971; Marchand and Pestieau 1984). However, from the optimization
problem (6) and condition (3) we receive the optimal investment path of the
jurisdictional government as
oYtþ1
oGi;tþ1
¼ ð1 þ kÞð1 þ nÞ c
y
tþ1
c
y
t
 ð1  viÞ: ð10Þ
Condition (10) can be interpreted as a modified golden rule of government
investment (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). It states that decreasing lifetime con-
sumption for the individuals working in period t leads to a decrease of their utility
Lt
ou
ocyt
¼ Lt ð1þJÞcyt but makes an increase in the utility of the individuals working in
period t+1 possible through public capital accumulation. According to the opti-
mality condition, this utility increase discounted to t using the social discount rate k
> 0 must equal the initial utility decrease. Condition (10) shows that the rate of
return on government capital does not unconditionally equal the marginal product of
private capital, which according to (2) and (9) equals r*. Rather, it would appear that
r* (and with that the private rate of time preference) exceeds the marginal social rate
of time preference.10
10 Marglin (1963) discusses some reasons why there should be a difference between the way we view
saving versus consumption decisions collectively and the way we view these decisions individually.
Nevertheless, the assumption that the private rate of time preference differs from the social one is not
decisive for our results. Marglin (1963) discusses some reasons why there should be a difference between
the way we view saving versus consumption decisions collectively and the way we view these decisions
individually. Nevertheless, the assumption that the private rate of time preference differs from the social
one is not decisive for our results.
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5 Restriction to a wage tax or a source tax
What happens if the government is restricted to one or the other tax instrument
for whatever reason? First we consider the case where only a wage tax is
imposed, so that the optimal investment path of the jurisdictional government is
given by:
oYtþ1
oGi;tþ1
¼ ð1 þ kÞð1+nÞ c
y
tþ1
c
y
t
 ð1  viÞ
 
þ oYtþ1
oGK;tþ1
GK;tþ1
  o
oYtþ1
oKtþ1
Ktþ1þ oYtþ1
oGK;tþ1
GK;tþ1
 
oGi;tþ1
oWtþ1
oKtþ1
Ktþ1 þ oYtþ1oGK;tþ1 GK;tþ1
ð11Þ
This optimality condition equals (10) only if the output share of public inputs
appropriated by mobile capital ½oYtþ1=oGK;tþ1GK;tþ1 is zero, so that the second part
of the RHS of Eq. 11 disappears. In this case hK,t* = 0 holds and condition (9) is not
violated by the restriction, but it is efficient to finance all public investments by a
wage tax.
Equation (11) shows that the opportunity costs of all three kinds of public
inputs include the excess burden incurred by a non-optimal tax policy. Although
the wage tax itself can be interpreted as a non-disturbing lump sum tax, it is not
the appropriate tax instrument to confiscate the private capital’s factor rent. Thus
the restriction to a wage tax leads to the problem of an inefficiently high inflow
of private capital. Equation (2) shows that for hK,t = 0 the marginal output effect
of private capital, i.e. its partial productivity is lower than the marginal revenue
of private capital r*. Excluding the source tax, it becomes impossible to reach
the optimum described by Eq. 9. Furthermore, investment in GK,t now has to be
financed by a wage tax, which again lowers the available income of the private
households. Assuming constant output elasticities a, b and ei (i = L,K,P) with
respect to labour, private capital and all three kinds of public capital, (11)
reduces to
oYtþ1
oGi;tþ1
¼ ð1 þ kÞð1 þ nÞ c
y
tþ1
c
y
t
 ð1  viÞ
  ða þ eLÞb þ eK
ða þ eLÞ b þ eKð Þ ð11
0Þ
Equation (11’) shows that the opportunity costs rise unequivocally with respect to
all public factors and are the same for GP,t+1, GL,t+1 and GK,t+1. Only for eK = 0 Eq.
(11’) equals Eq. (10).
If the government is restricted to a source tax, the opportunity costs of public
investment become
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oYtþ1
oGi;tþ1
¼ 1 þ kð Þð1+nÞ c
y
tþ1
cyt
oWt
oKt
h i
roðYtþ1Wtþ1Þ
oKtþ1
 
oWtþ1
oKtþ1
 
roðYtWtÞ
oKt
h i  ð1  viÞ
0
BB@
1
CCA
 oYtþ1
oGK;tþ1
GK;tþ1
h i
 P
i¼P;K;L
Gi;tþ2  ð1  viÞGi;tþ1
 	( ) oWtþ1oGi;tþ1
 
oWtþ1
oKtþ1
Ktþ1
 
: ð12Þ
Under the arbitrary assumption that total public net investmentP
i¼P;K;L Gi;tþ1  ð1  viÞGi;t
 	
equals the factor rent oYtþ1
oGK;tþ1
GK;tþ1, the restriction on
a source tax is not binding. In this case the second term of the RHS of Eq. (12)
vanishes and since r* = qYt/qKt the whole expression (12) reduces to (10). In all
other cases, the restriction on a source tax is binding and the opportunity costs of
public capital adjust. If we again assume constant output elasticities in the long run,
public opportunity costs are given by
oY
oGi
¼ 1 þ kð Þð1 þ nÞ  ð1  viÞ½ 
b
b þ eK 
P
i¼P;K;L
n þ við ÞGi½ =Y
 !
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA: ð12
0Þ
For public net investment
P
i¼P;K;L ðn þ viÞGi½  exceed the income share eKY
that, according to Eq. (9), equals the optimal source tax revenue, the restriction hL,t
= 0 raises the opportunity costs of all three public inputs. Therefore the government
invests less than it would without this restriction.
6 Incidence of a source-based capital tax in the long run
The derived results can be illustrated by examining the functional distribution of
income between mobile private capital and labour. For the sake of simplicity only
GK,t is considered, whereas the two others types of public capital are neglected. The
production function is specified in the form Yt ¼ Lat Kbt GeKK;t, where the constant
output elasticity with respect to labour, private capital and public capital, a + b
+ eK = 1 and a ,b,eK > 0. In the following, we focus on the steady state and neglect
population growth, so that n = 0.11
Figure 1 shows the convex partial productivity curve of private capital (qY/
qK) = b (Y/K) for given GK and L. Ceteris paribus, an extension of public capital
supply GK improves the partial marginal productivity of private capital as a result of
the indirect productivity effect and thus shifts the productivity curve upwards.
However, this indirect productivity effect does not justify a source tax. We know that
11 Ni and Wang (1995) discuss the stability properties in a comparable system. They show that under the
assumptions made the steady states are locally stable.
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the marginal revenue of private capital exceeds its partial marginal product if eK > 0.
Therefore, a second pointed line is drawn in Fig. 1, which shows the marginal
revenue of private capital given by oY
oK þ
oYt
oGK
GK
K ¼ ðb þ eKÞYK. Aggregate income is
marked by the marginal productivity curve, but the distribution of the income
between the two private factors depends on the pointed auxiliary curve.
When no source tax is levied, r* is the price of private capital and the market
equilibrium is given by KL ¼ b þ eKð Þ=rð ÞLaGeKKð Þ1=1b since private capital
revenue exceeds its partial marginal productivity. The corresponding total output
YL ¼ b þ eKð Þ=rð ÞbLaGeKK
 1=1b
, i.e. gross income of the factors employed in the
small open economy, is represented by the area 0KLFB. Total income can be
divided into aggregate wage income and aggregate capital income. Since capital
income equals KLr*, it is shown by the area 0KLEr* and gross wage income WL
= YLKL r* is given by the residual (r*AB-AFE). The available income of the
private household is given by VL = WL/L. In the long run, equilibrium public
investment and thus the long run costs of providing GK are given by /L = v K GK, as
represented in Fig. 1 by the areas r*DCQ. Using a wage tax as a financing
instrument for public infrastructure the available wage income of the private
household is represented by the area VL = (r*AB-AFE- r*DCQ). If the wage tax is
replaced by a source tax, user costs of private capital rise to r*/(1hK) and private
capital is driven out of the small open economy. In the equilibrium, the capital stock
shrinks from KL to KK ¼ b=rð ÞLat GeKK;t
 1=1b
, for hK = hK* = eK/(1a). The
change in the tax instrument further induces a decrease in aggregate income from
YL to YK ¼ b=rð ÞbLat GeKK;t
 1=1b
, where YK is represented by the area 0KKAB.
The source tax revenue /K = vKGK is given by the shaded areas r*AHP which
Fig. 1 Incidence of a source tax
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exactly equals r*DCQ.12 However, the reduction of aggregate output shown by the
area KKKLFA is not borne by private households. By subtracting the gross capital
income KKr*, represented by OKKAr* and the source tax revenue r*AHP from the
aggregate income YK, one derives the available wage income of the private
households WK = VK = (0KKAB-0KKAr*r*AHP).13 Compared to the case where
a wage tax is levied, the available income VK exceeds VL by AFE.
7 Conclusions
The idea that even in conditions of fiscal competition mobile capital can be taxed
according to the benefit principle to finance public infrastructure is widespread. Oates
(1999) argues that if capital tax revenue is used by government to supply public
infrastructure that improves the productivity of private capital, the tax-induced
increase of the costs of capital in the jurisdiction will be compensated by an increase in
the return of capital and thus counteract the capital outflow. However, the question
remains whether the benefit of a capital inflow induced by infrastructure that is
financed by a tax on immobile factors exceeds the benefit of a source tax.
Taking the perspective of a small, open and autonomous jurisdiction, it can be
shown that the optimal financing instrument of public infrastructure depends on some
technical properties of the publicly provided inputs. Public inputs of the ‘‘creation of
atmosphere’’ type should not be financed by a source tax on mobile capital despite the
fact that these inputs have an indirect productivity-enhancing effect on private capital.
The same holds for publicly provided private inputs that are bound on labour. Public
inputs, that evoke only indirect productivity effect on private capital, does not justify a
source tax on the mobile factor. Actually, a source tax is an efficient financing
instrument only for public capital that generates a factor rent on private capital. If such
a factor rent occurs, it should be confiscated by the government through a source tax. If
the government is, for whatever reason, restricted to a wage or a source tax, the supply
of public capital can become suboptimal.
Appendix
This appendix presents some results derived in the text:
Z /K;t;/L;t; Gi;tþ1; Ktþ1

  ¼ WþXT
t¼1
lt /L;t þ /K;t 
X
i¼P;K;L
Gi;tþ1 þ ð1  viÞGi;t
" #
þ
XT
t¼1
qt YtðGi;t; KtÞ  WtðGi;t; KtÞ  /K;t  rKt
 	
12 Note, that the source tax revenue vK GK = /K meets Eq. 9 only if k = 0.
13 VL ¼ VK ðb þ eKÞ=bð Þ
b
1b eK=að Þ
h i
and ðb þ eKÞ=bð Þ
b
1b eK=að Þ
h i
\1
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oZ
o/L;t
¼ oW
o/L;t
þ lt  0; /L;t  0;/L;t
oZ
o/L;t
¼ 0 ð13Þ
oZ
o/K;t
¼ lt  qt  0; /K;t  0;/K;t
oZ
o/K;t
¼ 0 ð14Þ
oZ
oKtþ1
¼ oW
oKtþ1
þ qtþ1
oðYtþ1  Wtþ1Þ
oKtþ1
 r
 
¼ 0 ð15Þ
qtþ1 ¼ 
oW
oKtþ1
h i
oðYtþ1Wtþ1Þ
oKtþ1
 r
h i
oZ
oGi;tþ1
¼ oW
oGi;tþ1
 lt þ ltþ1ð1  viÞ þ qtþ1
oðYtþ1  Wtþ1Þ
oGi;tþ1
 
¼ 0 ð16Þ
Eliminating the Lagrange parameters and replacing
/K;t ¼ hK;tðYt  WtÞ ¼ ½oYt=oGK;tGK;t according to (9) we receive the modified
golden rule of public investment presented in (10).
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